Alphonce M.De’ Liguori: Holy, Lawyer

Prof. Dalla Torre introduced his talk, reiterating the theme of the holiness of the laity which had already been treated by Padre Drago. Prof. Dalla Torre observed that in the meeting organised by Lawyers in Mission there was a provocation: ” there is a provocation in talking about holiness. I would say that there is a double provocation, not only talking about holiness but talking about holiness here. We may ask ourselves….why do we get out of proper places of holiness to enter places of other purposes, of other activities? Yes, why? I would say that this is the aspect of major provocation.” On the other hand – added the speaker – ” if it is true that holiness in certain aspects may not appear fashionable, in other aspects we know well that it is being searched for. All these new forms of religiosity that have invaded the contemporary society are nothing else but a search for perfection….. to which man aspires and not always manages to get” At this point the speaker observed, having in mind the figure of St. Alphonce de Liguori as in the western society one can be able to identify, ” two great models who have in some way shaped the identities of people of the west, in particular we Europeans. The model of antiquity is that of a hero. The model from medieval times onwards was that of the saint. And this model of the saint was so strong, so incisive, that it has shaped our european and western identity, that there are even lay saints, that there are even lay martyrs.”…….” In order to talk of a person who has showed his proper presence in society in a particularly strong manner, particularly incisive, particularly significant way, we have no other reference other than that of the saint. Saints or martyrs were those of the risorgimento (revival), saints or martyrs were those of the resistance, and so on. The model of the saint is a model to which we orient ourselves inevitably, as a higher and more expressive reference of humanity. Well, what difference is there between a hero and a saint? What difference is there between the ancient pagan hero, the Homeric hero and the saint? The difference is substantial and radical because the hero is one who in some way has transcended or transcends his own humanity, is a semi god. A hero is young, is a warrior, is handsome, is perfect and nearer the gods that men; in some way he is a kind of projection of what each one of us would like to become – conscious of our own limitations. That which we would like to become but which we have not managed to arrive at. …….Vice versa the saint is contrary to all. The saint is – we may say – the model of a humanity seen in fullness but in imperfection, with all limitations of humanity. He is the model , anti model of the hero. He is one who in substance is not detached from man but who searches to reach perfection in his being man. I have in mind a very suggestive image, which Padre Drago certainly knows because we find it in a sanctuary which is dear to Franciscans, the sanctuary of Leccio….is an image of St. Francis which is not very beautiful from the iconographic point view, a small body, a big head, weeping eyes… it is not the beautiful image we have at Subiaco with the still Byzantine stiles…well then, that is the image more realistic but of the saint, I do not speak of St. Francis, because I don’t know whether he was effectively so, but certainly of a saint, that is of one who is not transcended by his own humanity, but one who lives fully his humanity.” At this point the speaker observed how this vision of the saint is perfectly coherent with the Christian vision, ” because the centre of the Christian creed is the centre of incarnation. It is not man who becomes God, but God who becomes man and assumes the fullness of human nature while obviously remaining God. The passage which Padre Drago remembered of Lumen Gentium of the Second Vatican Council, says it very clearly; when it affirms that Christ reveals man to man, meaning man in his fullness, in his integrality, in his truth. I say this, because if it is true – as I believe to be true – that holiness is not a transcending of oneself and of ones human nature, but that it is instead life in fullness and in truth of ones own human nature,….then there is sense in speaking about holiness and there is sense in speaking about holiness even in this place, because here is not to change the place in which justice must be administered into a temple, into an oratory or into a church, but nothing else but to help, favour the growth of a community that works within the themes of justice according to humanity and according to the truth, that is all that is the basis of holiness. In short, for us Christians, we are not asked not to be men. We Christians are asked to be men in fullness. This is the point of reference. I believe that it is necessary to free our culture which is based over the centuries on the thought that a saint is something unreachable. Just as I believe that it is necessary to free ourselves from a culture that is based over the centuries thinking of a saint only as a thaumaturgy (miracle worker). For Christianity an authentic saint is not a thaumaturgy, but one to imitate and one who is imitable, that is, one who, more than others, has managed to live his own humanity in fullness.” The speaker then went on: in this perspective we bear in mind the importance of a memory and of a remembrance of the model of the saint who was St. Alphonce De Liguori. St. Alphonce did many things, he founded a religious order, he was a bishop, he was a great theologian and a great moralist, but today we want to see how St. Alphonce de Liguori came from a legal career. He obtained his first degree at the age of 16 from Napoli, the Federican University, performing forensic activities, working as judge of great culture, a man who grew in a napolitan environment of the ‘700 of important cultural growth. Napoli was one of the great european cultural centres and so St. Alphonce was a man who visited jurists of great fame: Filangeri, Pagani, Iannone and so on. Therefore, Alphonce was a man with a very strong juridical culture. I am not here to give a biography of St. Alphonce, because I have neither the time nor adequate knowledge about him. That which I would rather like to bring to your attention, is this concept; whether the saint was a man who experienced fully his humanity, the model of a saint incarnated in St. Alphonce who was a jurist before being a man of religion, before being a bishop, before being a pastor or an expert of morality; can be an emblematic model imitable by whoever exercises forensic activities. He can be particularly a strong point of reference for lawyers. Perhaps not all know the events that led to the radical change in the life of St. Alphonce. A young and brilliant lawyer, at some moment he was entrusted with a case of great legal interest and social standing besides naturally being of great economic interest to the Duke Filippo Orsini against the great duke of Toscana. St. Alphonce loses this case. Hagiographers write that St. Alphonce never lost the case, but this we do not know, as sometimes hagiographers tend to exaggerate. However, we know for sure that St. Alphonce lost this very important case. No one knows why he lost. There are two versions. The first is rather accredited to the thesis that St. Alphonce had lost this case because he had undervalued some clauses which were in the acts and which he should have studied, exercising in short his proper ministry of defender, of patron. Others instead hold that he lost the case because of political influence over those who had to decide the case. We are not certain about this, but we are certain that from this act, Alphonce came out upset. He was so upset to the point of leaving the profession, leaving secular activity and take up ecclesiastical life and then religious life with the foundation of an order in which he would be the founder.” Up to this point the speaker fixed his attention on analysing the influence of the saint on juridical studies and the experience acquired from his legal practice on the successive activity as a moralist, as a pastor and as a founder of a religious order. Among others, Prof. Dalla Torre observed: ” It would be inconceivable of St. Alphonce, moralist, during a century of two opposed extremes of rigorism of giansenist type and laxism as the idealistic middle way of the most delicate problem of sin, of penitence, of confession, if there wouldn’t have been perhaps the knowledge of the juridical culture of Alphonce. It would have been equally inconceivable to understand Alphonce’s doctrinal thinking in theological and moral matters without understanding his experience and culture….” At this point the speaker tried to single out, ” essential points that I would like to recall in this very short commemoration to say that the saint is always an imitable saint. A saint who is not imitable is never a saint but a false saint. Therefore, even St. Alphonce can be an imitable saint by whoever exercises legal profession. The first aspect to underline in the thinking of St. Alphonce is that of the primacy of positive law over written law. And this is a strong and hard discourse for us because we are accustomed to understanding law as written law. Law is the positive law, the general principles of juridical order, to which the code calls us to make reference. Still it is evident that we are aware of the legality of action, the legitimacy of action; meaning that there is or there can be a difference that can make us justly say that this law is just or unjust, this sentence is just or unjust. And there effectively exists – I am talking to you who are jurists and therefore know these things well – the abuse of law. I act according to my law, the exercise of this law but in reality it is abuse, because it damages that which is the principle of substantial justice. Well, I believe the first teaching of St. Alphonce as a jurist is properly this: the necessity of bearing in mind always this aspect of dynamic legality – legitimacy. That does not mean legitimising attitudes of disobedience, of rebellion, of contrast or worse still, of not attending to one’s duties. The function of a jurist which is certainly begins in his activity of exegesis of the norm from positive law from the given provisions, but means bearing in mind that there is room for diversity between these two terms and that not always that the two dimensions of legality – legitimacy coincide. A second point: the law must always be an instrument of value – I use this term in quotes – the ethics which is proper to law. We have a distorted concession even here which derives from some doctrines which have dominated the juridical culture of the ‘900 according to which positive law must be an authoritative instrument for the imposition of ideology and of an ethics which is among many others….in reality it is not so. In reality law has the function of binding the ethics which is proper to it…and which is the ethics proper to law? Well, we reassume the word justice. The function of law is to render to each his, or to guarantee equal relationships; to protect the weaker part in relationship; to recognize what is one’s own. It appears simple but in reality we know that in practice it is not that easy. The third aspect- I go for synthesis – the thinking of St. Alphonce: the centrality of the problem of interpretation. We know that the task of a jurist, be it of the learned, be it that of a judge, be it that of a lawyer, be it of a public administrator, the main task of a jurist is that of interpreting the norms. The task of a jurist is the interpretation. It is a highest and most fascinating level of our work, we jurists. St. Alphonce insists on this centrality of interpretation, because interpretation brings once more that point which I recalled previously, that is, the paradigm of the virtue of justice, as a point of reference of interpretation and therefore as the animation of living law. It is very difficult to see how some of the laws can enter into our conscience absolutely- I say into our conscience, not in our intellect – absolutely unacceptable. It can happen, but it is very difficult. In all other cases however, we can have a plurality of possible interpretations, and so a plurality of ways that are open to us and may not always be coherent with the principle of justice and the virtue of justice. There are different options in which a different interpretation can be enlarged, widening those two elements of legality and legitimacy to which I first made reference. It is necessary to consider this tension of St. Alphonce, not to exclude, but on the contrary to find also a law which would appear unjust, those interpretative ways that can conform to justice. And still the primacy of conscience. Obviously Alphonce is a moralist, but I have already told you that before being a moralist, Alphonce is first of all a jurist and his work of a moralist cannot be understood without having in mind his juridical culture which puts attention on the person, on the individual and so attention on conscience. We today are used to speak of conscience especially as something which is in terms of contrast with positive law: the objection of conscience. Certainly, the discourse here is also complex. And there is no doubt that it should be so. We know that the law legitimises some objection of conscience, just as we know that there are illegitimate objections of conscience. Personally as a learned person in these themes and these arguments, I retain that you cannot speak of objection of conscience when the law recognizes it, because in case of recognition there is no more contrast between internal and external norms. The true objection of conscience is when the law does not recognize it. When I value my conscience and accept the sanctions which condemn the behaviour which I think conform to the dictation of conscience, I do not rebel, I accept and take the sanctions. I recognize the legitimacy of juridical order, but I object to the moral contents and values crystallized in it and therefore I prefer between the two possible behaviour – to obey and not receive sanctions or not to obey and receive sanctions – I prefer to receive sanctions. I do not give myself to stain, I do not hide myself, and this is alright, but I testify to this ulterior value that is antithetic in respect to that contained in law. But, here the discourse – which I would only like to point – in respect to that which is the principle of recall to the conscience of Alphonce is another. It is not in a negative sense that I make a contrast between conscience and law, between internal norms and external ones, but rather of the solidarity which must be there. That is, the awareness that the law – as positive law – rests its force essentially in the measure in which in each one of us and in the general collectiveness it is acknowledged in the level of conscience. That is in the measure in which it does not appear like an exterior command but which is interiorised and shared. In other words, said more simply, but perhaps more clearly – it is evident that a law which rests on the consensus of conscience of each of the associates is stronger than a norm which rests on the fear of the carabineers or the fear of judgement or condemnation. I believe that in the major part of cases, the penal code is not violated, not so much out of this fear, as out of the sharing that the associates have some of the values that the legislator has expressed in the positive norm. Under this profile, the recall to the conscience that means in short a profound rooted ness of values that are subject to order and which render possible associated life is another principle – particularly relevant – that we get from the works of Alphonce. And lastly – but because there is need to make a list, is that relative to the professional deontology. I have told you of the professional failures in the origins of Alphonce’s choices in life and I have told you therefore how much this professional failure shaped his later life. I have also recalled his attention – from the point of view of moral theology and from the point of view of his practice as a confessor – to the themes of deontology, that is, themes of correct professional behaviour which are coherent with values which must precede them. You were given the Decalogue of St. Alphonce. It is enough to go through it to see how much it is not only actual, but also how it responds to those which should be the regulations, the great lines of the activities on the level of justice. Never accept unjust cases, because they are harmful to the conscience and one’s dignity. An unjust case is deepened by identifying where the injustice lies; here is the problem of discernment, the problem of interpretation, the problem of the study of the case. Never defend a case using illicit and unjust means; never burden a client with unworthy expenses; otherwise the lawyer is obliged to restitution. The cases of a client should be treated with the kind of commitment one would have when treating his/her own cases; deferment and negligence of lawyers incur damaging expenses to clients; and therefore they should repair the damages, otherwise they sin against justice; a lawyer should implore God’s help in the defence, because God is the first defender of justice. It is not praiseworthy for a lawyer to accept many cases beyond his/her talent, powers, at the same time available and that he misses at the defence. Here, perhaps there is an autobiographic vibration, if it is true that first thesis according to which carelessness of the study of some contractual clauses would have been the origin of the loss of the case. Justice and honesty must never be separated from the catholic lawyer; on the contrary they must be protected like the pupil of an eye. A lawyer who loses a case because of his negligence has the obligation to pay all the damages to his/her client. To defend a case it is necessary to be truthful, sincere, respectful and reasonable. Here St. Alphonce does not call one to lose the case, but calls one to give the best of himself/herself, like a jurist in a case. One should not seek little tricky ways or cunning paths to reach his objective but rather through the teaching way even though it should be the most tiring. The prerequisites of a lawyer are, science, diligence, truth, faithfulness and justice. I do not wish to go any further. I have said that I would be brief, and I can see that time has gone. I want only to remember the idea from where I started: holiness – as is different from the model of a hero – is to live one’s own humanity in fullness. St. Alphonce certainly shows the way in his life his experience in his great culture, in all that he produced, this way is an imitable way for us jurists and it is certainly a way to imitate.”